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SUPERVISING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS:
THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE SUPERVISORY
POWER OF FEDERAL JUDGES
Hon. John Gleeson"
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors in the federal system wield enormous power. Their
power to investigate allegations or even mere suspicions of criminal
activity is plenary. Their tools of investigation are impressive. The
federal grand jury, though not textually assigned to any of the
branches of government,' "[b]asically ... is a law enforcement
agency,"2 and its power to gather evidence is virtually unlimited.'
Upon a proper showing, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
. United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York. The author
thanks Dwight Holton and Steven Weiser for their valuable assistance.
The author was formerly an Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of
the Criminal Division in the Eastern District of New York. In that capacity, he
participated in several of the cases cited in this Article, most notably United
States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
2 United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
936 (1959); see Hon. Irving R. Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its
Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331, 336 (1954) (describing the role of the federal grand jury
and noting that the United States Attorney uses the grand jury's subpoena powers
to bring information forward).
3 A grand jury "generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and
evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials." United States v. R.
Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition,
"absent a strong showing to the contrary," the law presumes "that a grand jury
acts within the legitimate scope of its authority." Id. at 300. A subpoena for
documents may not be quashed on relevancy grounds unless its recipient meets
a virtually insurmountable burden; that is, "that there is no reasonable possibility
that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information
relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation." Id. at 301.
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and Safe Streets Act of 1968' permits prosecutors and the law
enforcement agents working with them to intercept private
conversations.5 The federal immunity statute allows prosecutors to
compel testimony without forfeiting the possibility of prosecuting
the witness from whom it is compelled.6 The contempt power of
the court is available to coerce testimony from uncooperative
witnesses; even those who face the prospect of being killed if they
testify can be jailed if they refuse.7 Investigating prosecutors may
lawfully exploit their target's misplaced trust in friends, using those
friends to induce and record incriminating conversations. Indeed,
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, by giving prosecutors the
key to sentencing leniency,8 have produced a seemingly inexhaus-
tible supply of such "cooperators." 9
4 Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
See Wire and Electric Communications Interception and Interception of
Oral Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d) (1970 & Supp. 1996).
6 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1985); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The
Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1109 (1995).
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970) (providing for suitable confinement of
recalcitrant witnesses who refuse to testify without just cause until such time that
the witness decides to cooperate); United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 430, 431-32
(2d Cir. 1988) (affirming the confinement order of subpoenaed witness who
refused to testify before grand jury claiming that his life had been threatened).
In affirming a confinement order, the Second Circuit stated:
Requiring the government to show both that the information it hopes
to obtain from [the recalcitrant witness] is significant and that that
information is unavailable from other sources would obviously impair
the efficiency of grand juries. Such a requirement would bring
investigations to intermittent standstills as the government set out to
prove the necessity of each piece of information it sought to obtain.
Id.
8 The key is given to prosecutors by United States Sentencing Guidelines
§ 5K1.1, which allows a district court to depart downward from the prescribed
sentencing range based on "substantial assistance to the government" only if the
prosecutor makes a motion authorizing the departure. Wade v. United States, 504
U.S. 181, 181 (1992). Congress provided the same escape mechanism for
defendants facing the onerous mandatory minimum sentence for certain narcotic
offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1996).
9 Research for this Article revealed no data on the number of cooperation
agreements entered into before the Sentencing Guidelines took effect in 1987.
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This array of investigative tools is complemented by an equally
impressive arsenal of prosecutive tools. In a single stroke, the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ° swept a
broad range of criminal activity that had traditionally been the
province of state prosecutors into federal court" and created a
mechanism that permits a single trial of various crimes and various
defendants that previously would have been splintered into separate
trials of each crime and each defendant. 2 Under the Bail Reform
Act of 1984,"3 defendants may be forced to defend the case from
their prison cells even if they are not risks of flight, 14 and their
assets might be frozen pending trial even if they intend to use
them. 15 Once the trial begins, the rules of procedure in federal
court permit prosecutors to seek convictions based on the uncorrob-
orated testimony of a single accomplice witness.'
6
The impact of these powers on the targets of federal criminal
investigations cannot be overstated. The service of a single grand
jury subpoena can ruin a person's livelihood and, on occasion, even
jeopardize a person's life. A lengthy investigation is likely to
change the target's life irrevocably, even if there is no indictment;
However, the number of substantial assistance departures has grown dramatically
as the full impact of the Sentencing Guidelines has sunk in. During the 12
months prior to September 30, 1990, federal courts departed downward due to
substantial assistance in 7.5% of all cases. 1990 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION
ANNUAL REPORT 324 tbl.C-5 (1990). By the year ending September 30, 1995,
this figure had grown to 19.7%. 1995 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL
REPORT 89 tbl.31 (1995).
'0 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
" See id. § 1961(1)(A) (1984) (racketeering activity includes "any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance . . . which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year").
2 Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 661, 702 (1987).
'" 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142-3148.
14 See id § 3142 (1994 & Supp. 1996); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 748 (1987).
'5 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 632 (1989).
16 See Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 6, at 1104-08.
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an indictment almost certainly will change the target's life, even if
there is no conviction.
As prosecutors' discretion becomes greater, so too does the risk
of abuse. "The range of prosecutorial conduct capable of inspiring
allegations of unfairness appears unlimited."' 7 There is an ever-
widening gulf between what prosecutors are permitted to do under
the law and what may be right and just under the circumstances. A
prosecutor may lawfully subpoena fee information from the target's
attorney, 8 for example, but if the motive in doing so is to drive
a wedge between attorney and client, 9 no prosecutor should serve
such a subpoena.
These powers are frequently vested in the most inexperienced
attorneys among us. New Assistant United States Attorneys, at least
in New York and other large cities, tend to be only two or three
years out of law school, and frequently have no prior experience
with criminal cases. Mid-level supervisors are generally only four
or five years further along, and a forty-year-old prosecutor is
considered long in the tooth. It is true that the competition for a
position as an Assistant United States Attorney is stiff, and many
of them are very promising and talented young lawyers. Also, the
senior supervisors in such offices-the United States Attorney, the
Chief Assistant United States Attorney and the Chief of the
Criminal Division-are often seasoned, experienced lawyers. But
the fact remains that on a day-to-day basis, the broad prosecutorial
powers that have such a dramatic impact on people and are so
"7 United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1309 (1977). See United States
v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 60 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("like the Hydra
slain by Hercules, prosecutorial misconduct has many heads").
8 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 781 F.2d 238, 248 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1108 (1986).
'9 Serving a subpoena on an attorney "will immediately drive a chilling
wedge between the attorney/witness and his client." United States v. Klubock,
832 F.2d 649, 653 (1st Cir.), vacated, 832 F.2d 664 (1987) (en banc). In
Klubock, the en banc First Circuit affirmed, by an equally divided court, a
district court decision requiring federal prosecutors to seek prior judicial approval
before serving a subpoena on the attorney of a represented target. Id. at 653-54;
see Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995)
(upholding such a rule).
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susceptible to abuse are exercised by relatively inexperienced
attorneys in need of supervision.
The judicial temptation to supervise them is powerful. It seems
so natural: judges are more experienced, more dispassionate, better
able to weigh the investigators' legitimate interests against
principles of fairness and, presumably, wiser.2" There are signs
that the temptation is becoming even stronger. In United States v
Ming He,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit criticized the Sentencing Guidelines for vesting in the
prosecutor, rather than the judge, the "discretion to decide whether
to reduce a sentence based on a defendant's assistance., 22 To
compensate for this "especially troubling" transfer of authority, and
to "balance this broad executive discretion," the Second Circuit
resorted to its "supervisory power" to create the rule that during the
course of criminal investigations cooperating witnesses are entitled
to have counsel present at debriefings, unless they explicitly waive
such assistance. 23 The court's stated purpose was to "place a check
on the prosecutor's discretion," and thereby "reduce the danger of
prosecutorial overreaching in what is essentially a relationship tilted
heavily towards the government. ,24
Ming He was the immediate inspiration for this Article. It is the
Second Circuit's most recent exercise of its supervisory authority
over federal criminal investigations. It demonstrates the increasing
pressure judges feel to take back, or at least balance, some of the
power that has been vested in the executive branch. This is not a
20 See Dennis E. Curtis, Comment, Mistretta and Metaphor, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 607, 619 (1992) (criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines for transferring
sentencing authority from older, more experienced judges to federal prosecutors
who "tend to spend only their early practice years" in government).
2! 94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996).
22 Id. at 788; see supra note 8 (briefly describing Sentencing Guidelines
§ 5K.1). Actually, it is still true that only judges have the discretion to reduce
a sentence on this ground, and may properly refuse to do so even if the
government requests it. What the Ming He court found objectionable was the
prosecutor's virtually unreviewable authority to decide whether to trigger this
discretion, i.e., to make the "SK 1.1 motion" that is a prerequisite to the exercise
of the court's discretion.
23 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 788, 793.
24 Id. at 789.
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new phenomenon; Ming He follows by eight years United States v
Hammad,25 another exercise of the supervisory power in the
criminal investigative setting, which also grew out of the court's
perception that prosecutors wield too much power.
The modest goal of this Article is two-fold. First, this Article
closely examines these two exercises of judicial authority by the
Second Circuit to create rules in the criminal investigative setting.
Both rules have failed to achieve the court's goals and, indeed,
have inadvertently produced both doctrinal confusion and unintend-
ed consequences that may well harm the intended beneficiaries of
the rules they prescribe.
Second, this Article examines the escalating pressure on judges
to supervise prosecutors-resulting directly from the Sentencing
Guidelines-which warrants a revisiting of the supervisory power.
The origin and development of this source of judicial authority
makes clear that it is not nearly as broad as Hammad and Ming He
assume it to be. Indeed, the increasingly powerful temptation to
resort to it to supervise prosecutors should be resisted. Judges are
in fact not well-suited to supervise criminal investigations, a
process which is generally best left to the executive branch. The
attempts to supervise investigations in Hammad and Ming He
reveal these institutional shortcomings, and also demonstrate the
danger posed by interfering with the appropriate division of powers
among the branches of government.
I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S EFFORTS To SUPERVISE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
A. United States v Hammad: Sham Subpoenas and Other
Possible 4olations of the "No-Contact" Rule
1. The Rule Established by Hammad
Hammad involved a federal grand jury investigation into the
suspicious burning of the Hammad Department Store in Brooklyn,
25 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
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New York. As the investigation pro,'essed, the Assistant United
States Attorney became aware that the store owners, Taiseer and
Eid Hammad, allegedly defrauded Medicaid out of $400,000 by
claiming reimbursement for orthopedic footwear when the shoes
they sold were actually ordinary, non-therapeutic shoes. To
disprove those allegations, the Hammads provided invoices to the
Medicaid investigators purporting to reflect their purchases of
orthopedic shoes from Wallace Goldstein of the Crystal Shoe
Company ("Crystal").26
Goldstein, however, told the prosecutor that those invoices were
fraudulent and were fabricated by him to help the Hammads.
Goldstein also agreed to tape record conversations with the
Hammads. In the first conversation, Goldstein falsely told Taiseer
Hammad that Goldstein had been subpoenaed to appear before the
grand jury to produce the records of Crystal's sales to the Hammad
Department Store. Taiseer promptly incriminated himself, urging
Goldstein to conceal the fraud by lying to the grand jury and by
refusing to produce the true sales records from Crystal. He also
questioned Goldstein about the subpoena. In a subsequent conversa-
tion, which was both recorded and videotaped, Goldstein showed
Taiseer Hammad a fake subpoena supplied by the prosecutor as a
cover for Goldstein. The subpoena called for Goldstein to appear
before the grand jury with the Crystal records that reflected shoe
sales to the Hammad Department Store. Taiseer Hammad was
recorded devising strategies for Goldstein to avoid compliance.27
The Hammads were indicted six months later, and Taiseer
Hammad moved to suppress the recordings of the conversations
with Goldstein on the ground that the prosecutor had violated the
"no-contact" rule in Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-104(A)(1) of the
American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Code of Professional
Responsibility,2 8 which applied to federal prosecutors in the
26 Id. at 835.
27 Id. at 835-36.
28 The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
A. During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer
shall not:
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Eastern District of New York.29 Specifically, he claimed that he
had been represented by counsel when the Assistant United States
Attorney sent Goldstein to meet with him, and that the Assistant
United States Attorney had knowledge of such representation.
Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet
attached,30 and thus was not violated by the government's use of
Goldstein, Hammad contended that the prosecutor had violated his
ethical obligations by communicating directly with him (through
the prosecutor's "alter ego," Goldstein) after learning that he had
retained counsel.3I
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on
the subject of the representation with a party he
knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by
law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1996). This
no-contact rule also exists, in similar terms, in Rule 4.2 of the ABA's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
29 For the most part, federal district courts do not promulgate their own
individual rules governing the conduct of attorneys who appear before them.
Rather, they generally incorporate by reference either the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") Model Code of Professional Responsibility, initially
adopted in 1970, the ABA's Model Rules, which were adopted in 1983 to
supersede the Model Code, or the rules adopted by the highest court of the state
in which the district is located. On occasion, as was the case in the Eastern
District of New York until March 1997, more than one set of rules were
incorporated, resulting in confusion over which rules the attorneys must follow.
See generally Committee on Criminal Law, Establishing Ethical Standards for
Federal Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers, 49 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 21, 22
(1994) [hereinafter Committee on Criminal Law]. The Eastern District of New
York amended its local rules in March 1997, to adopt the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility.
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to have ... the assistance of counsel for his defence.");
Kirby v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) ("In a line of constitutional cases in
this Court stemming back to the Court's landmark opinion in Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 [(1932)], it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and
Fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him [or her].").
"' Hammad, 858 F.2d at 836.
430
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The Second Circuit agreed that the disciplinary rule was
violated. First, it rejected the government's argument that the
no-contact rule should not apply to criminal investigations until the
right to counsel has attached. This view, the court held, would
render the disciplinary rule "superfluous."32 The court viewed the
disciplinary rules as a source of "protections not contemplated by
the Constitution,, 33 and reasoned that DR 7-104(A)(1) would
afford no protection at all if it could be invoked only when the
Sixth Amendment right had attached. The court also rejected the
government's proposed limitation on the applicability of the
disciplinary rule because it would give the government too much
power:
[W]e resist binding the Code's applicability to the moment
of indictment. The timing of an indictment's return lies
substantially within the control of the prosecutor. Therefore,
were we to construe the rule as dependent upon indictment,
a government attorney could manipulate grand jury proceed-
ings to avoid its encumbrances.
34
Second, the court recognized that prosecutors perform investiga-
tive duties in federal criminal investigations, and are "'authorized
by law' to employ legitimate investigative techniques in conducting
or supervising criminal investigations., 35 It further held that "the
use of informants to gather evidence against a suspect will
frequently fall within the ambit of such authorization. 36 However,
the court held that there were limits to this broad investigative
power, and the prosecutor's issuance of a sham subpoena to
Goldstein exceeded those limits. 37 This turned Goldstein into the
"alter ego of the prosecutor," 38 resulting in a violation of the
disciplinary rule. The court explicitly declined to identify the sorts
of investigative stratagems which, like a "sham" subpoena, would
32 Id. at 839.
33 Id.
34 id.
35 id.
36 id.
37 id.
38 id.
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convert the use of a wired informant against a represented target
into a violation of the disciplinary rule.39
Finally, the court in Hammad held that the suppression of
evidence was available to remedy violations of DR 7-104(A)(1) in
criminal investigations.40 It found this authority in the supervisory
power of federal courts. The court concluded that "[j]udicial
supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts ... implies the duty of establishing and maintaining
civilized standards of procedure and evidence."'4 Thus, although
the district court's order of suppression was reversed, that was only
because the law had been previously unsettled, and the remedy was
held to be available in future cases at the discretion of the district
judge.42
Hammad thus established a new rule for federal criminal
investigations. The rule applies to noncustodial contacts with targets
of an investigation in the preindictment stage, which the Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections do not reach. The rule is
this: if the target has retained an attorney in connection with the
investigation and the prosecutor knows it, it is generally permissible
to use a "wired" informant to obtain incriminating statements from
the target; but, if the prosecutor does something that is later found
to have overstepped permissible bounds, the prosecutor will have
violated DR 7-104(A)(1) and the statements may be suppressed.
2. The Consequences of the Rule
Hammad use of the supervisory power to create a new rule
for federal criminal investigations has spawned both unintended
adverse results and doctrinal chaos. First, in its effort to protect the
rights of persons under investigation, the decision inadvertently
created an incentive to isolate from the investigation the people
who are best able to recognize those rights and ensure they are not
violated. Until Hammad, the rights of individuals being investigated
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 841 (quoting Justice Frankfurter in McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 340 (1943)).
42 Id. at 842.
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or prosecuted by the government were all rights as against the
government. However, by construing a disciplinary rule to confer
an otherwise nonexistent protection to some criminal suspects
(those with the inclination and resources to retain counsel during an
investigation), Hammad conferred a right as against only part of
the government-its attorneys. Indeed, it gave law enforcement
agencies a powerful incentive to carve the attorneys-presumably
those in the best position to ensure that the law is obeyed-out of
the investigative process. This incentive became especially clear in
the subsequent decisions rejecting Hammad motions.43 Those
decisions were correctly viewed in the law enforcement community
as endorsements of investigative strategies that kept prosecutors
either minimally informed or entirely in the dark. The law should
never create such an incentive, and Hammad obviously did not
intend to do so. Indeed, it explicitly "recognized that prosecutors
have a responsibility to perf6rm investigative ... duties in criminal
matters."" By allowing a disciplinary rule to become the vehicle
of new-found rights, however, it encouraged law enforcement
officers to isolate the prosecutors from investigations.
Another unintended consequence of Hammad was its chilling
effect on the natural development of the law. Hammad found DR
7-104(A)(1) to be the source of a new "right" in the investigative
stage, but explicitly declined to state the contours of the right by
" See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 35 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1994)
(rejecting a Hammad-based challenge to an agent's interview of a represented
suspect on the ground that "Hammad does not support the extension of a rule of
professional conduct governing attorneys to an agent performing an investigative
function") (emphasis added); United States v. Buda, 718 F. Supp. 1094, 1096
(W.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying a Hammad motion because the prosecutor only
"acquiesced" in the "wiring" of an informant against a represented target, and did
not participate in preparing the informant for the conversation). See also United
States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that because the
Assistant United States Attorney "did not even know what [the agent who wired
the informant] was doing," the "ethical canons did not restrict" the investigation);
United States v. Gray, 825 F. Supp. 63, 64 (D. Vt. 1993) (stating that the agents'
interview of represented target did not violate the disciplinary rule because the
Assistant United States Attorney neither "control[led] the agents' independent
investigation" nor instructed them regarding what to ask the target).
"4 Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839.
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"list[ing] all possible situations that may violate DR 7-104(A)(1),"
leaving that for "case-by-case adjudication.""a Thus, district courts
were left to determine when a prosecutor had "overstep[ped] the
already broad powers of his office, and in so doing, violate[d] the
ethical precepts of DR 7-104(A)(1). ' '46 Ordinarily, such case-by-
case adjudication is a healthy and natural way for the law to grow;
district courts, armed with a stated principle, apply it to the various
factual situations that come before them, subject to appellate
review. However, by grounding the right in a disciplinary rule,
Hammad has stunted this kind of growth. The stakes are simply too
high. In weighing whether a particular investigative technique (such
as the sham subpoena in Hammad) might be found by some judge
at some future time to have "overstepped" the powers of the office,
prosecutors who guess wrong not only risk losing evidence, but
also risk losing their licenses to practice law.47 For years, this has
stifled the tendency to test the limits of the law, which otherwise
comes naturally to lawyers.48
Doctrinally, Hammad started out on unstable ground, and
matters have only gotten worse. Its essential holding is that
supplying a sham subpoena to a cooperating witness exceeds a
prosecutor's broad powers and violates DR 7-104(A)(1). However,
there is no fit between the conduct found offensive and the rule it
was found to violate. Even assuming there is something objection-
able about providing an informant with a sham subpoena,49 the
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 It may well be that all the prosecutor risks is disciplinary sanction. Since
the court deliberately left "unsettled" the types of conduct that trigger a violation,
suppression may not be ordered on a new application of the Hammad rule. Id.
at 842.
41 See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern
Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 460, 473 (1996); Todd S. Schulman, Wisdom Without Power:
The Department of Justice's Attempt to Exempt Federal Prosecutors from State
No-Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1078-79 (1996).
49 Hammad never explained why the sham subpoena overstepped the bounds
of the prosecutor's authority, and other courts that have addressed the issue have
flatly rejected such claims. For example, Judge Dolores K. Sloviter of the Third
Circuit stated:
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impropriety of this technique certainly does not turn on whether the
target is represented. If the goal is to curb prosecutorial over-
reaching, the unrepresented person-who receives no added
protection from the Hammad rule-is the more vulnerable target.
In short, the goal underlying the no-contact rule is not enhanced by
Hammad, which instead simply extends a modicum of further
insulation to those who happened to have retained counsel.
Second, by viewing the disciplinary rules as a source of rights
in addition to those secured by the U.S. Constitution, Hammad
overlooked the true purpose of the rules: to regulate and discipline
attorneys. This was critical to the court's rejection of the govern-
ment's argument that the no-contact rule should not apply in the
investigative stage. When the rules are perceived as a source of
rights for prospective criminal defendants, the government's
argument, if accepted, would indeed have rendered it superfluous.
However, when the no-contact rule is viewed as a mechanism for
attorney discipline, it is not superfluous at all, whether or not its
scope is made coextensive with the scope of the Sixth Amendment
right5 °
In certain respects, Hammad has become isolated over time. Its
holding that the no-contact rule applies during the investigative
phase of criminal cases has been rejected by every other circuit that
has addressed the issue to date." The number of devices that will
If government officials may pose as non-existent sheiks in an
elaborately concocted scheme, supply a necessary ingredient for a drug
operation, and utilize landing strips, docking facilities, and other
accoutrements of an organized smuggling operation, all in order to
catch criminals, then their use of a subpoena in the name of an
undercover agent to enable him to retain his credibility with suspected
criminals seems innocuous by comparison.
United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
'o See United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1990) (opining
that the holding that DR 7-104(A)(1) attaches only when the Sixth Amendment
right has attached does not render the rule superfluous because the "exclusion of
evidence is not the only possible remedy under the disciplinary rule").
"' See, e.g., United States v. Baiter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d
1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1983);
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push an otherwise authorized undercover contact with a represented
target over the line into unethical territory remains at one: sham
subpoenas. Although lower courts in the circuit are still asked from
time to time to add others,52 there is no indication that the brief
list will ever lengthen.
Even the Second Circuit has distanced itself from Hammad.
One year later, the court emphasized that its holding was limited to
the facts of the case.53 A more recent decision, Grievance
Committee for the Southern District of New York v Simels,54
arguably has the effect of overruling it. Simels addressed the
applicability of the "no-contact" rule to defense attorney conduct.
Two days before the beginning of the trial of Brooks Davis and
others on narcotics charges, an accomplice witness was shot. The
next day, Aaron Harper was arrested in connection with the
shooting, and he immediately cooperated with the government. On
the first day of the trial, the government charged Harper with the
attempted murder of the witness and stated that it would also
charge Brooks Davis and others with that crime. Harper's coopera-
tion with the government made him a witness in the pending
narcotics trial and a potential codefendant of Davis, as well as a
potential witness against him with respect to the shooting of the
witness.5
United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 989 (1974).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Tracy, No. 94-CR-142S, 1995 WL 522807
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1995), aff'd, No. 564, Docket 96-1100, 1997 WL 109210
(2d Cir. Mar. 13, 1997). In Tracy, the feature of the investigation that the
defendant claimed had triggered the Hammad rule was the fact that the
represented target was himself an attorney. Id. at *4. As required by Hammad,
the district court performed a post hoc survey of the investigation to determine
whether the prosecutor's conduct seemed "egregious." Id. at *5-6. After
examining "all of the facts and circumstances of the investigation," including the
tape recordings of the defendant, and comparing the investigation to a similar
case that had withstood Hammad-type scrutiny, the court found that the Assistant
United States Attorney had not engaged in egregious misconduct, and denied the
motion. Id.
5' United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 29 (2d Cir. 1989).
14 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995).
" Id. at 642-43.
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The next day, Davis's attorney, Simels, visited Harper in his jail
cell. Without the consent of Harper's attorney, Simels procured an
affidavit from Harper, which was offered to undermine Harper's
testimony in the narcotics trial. Simels found himself accused not
only of knowingly presenting a false affidavit and with using
threats to get Harper's signature on it, but with a violation of the
no-contact rule for interviewing Harper.56
The Second Circuit reversed the sanctions against Simels,
relying on very narrow constructions of the terms "party" and
"matter" in DR 7-104(A)(1).17 Rejecting state court and bar
association interpretations of DR 7-104(A)(1), the court emphasized
the need for a federal interpretation of such rules in order to
implement important policies. The court held that even individuals
named in the same charging instrument are not "parties" to the
same proceeding if one will testify against the other, and indeed
may not even be "parties" if they are actual codefendants.58 This
narrow construction was chosen because it "establishes a clear line
which allows both defense attorneys and prosecutors to carry out
their respective and necessary roles in our federal criminal justice
system without the threat of disciplinary action . .. .""
Simels cannot be dismissed simply because the attorney was a
defense attorney who had Sixth Amendment obligations that
prosecutors do not share. To the contrary, the court repeatedly
emphasized that the case had added significance because its
interpretation of DR 7-104(A)(1) would apply to prosecutors as
well. It insisted on a federal interpretation of the rule in order to
avoid the "balkanization" of the law governing investigations. The
court then narrowly interpreted the rule in order to allow defense
attorneys and prosecutors to do their jobs without the fear of
disciplinary sanction.6°
Although Simels did not overrule Hammad, it is difficult to
conclude that there is much left of it. First, even after the govern-
ment had charged one and announced in court its intention to
56 Id. at 643.
17 Id. at 644.
5" Id. at 650.
'9 Id. at 651.
60 Id. at 645, 651.
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charge the other with the same crime, if Harper and Davis were not
"parties" to a "matter" for the purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1), it is
hard to conclude that a target of a grand jury investigation is a
"party" to anything. Indeed, the court admonished that merely
"potential" codefendants must not be considered "parties."'" By
definition, the target of a grand jury investigation is at most a
potential defendant, and it will be difficult to reconcile any future
application of DR 7-104(A)(1) in that setting with Simels.
Most importantly, and again without explicitly rejecting
Hammad, Simels adopted a fundamentally different approach to the
purpose of the no-contact rule itself. Whereas Hammad viewed the
no-contact rule as a source of rights for prospective criminal
defendants-additional protections over and above the constitutional
"floor"62-Simels stripped the rule of that lofty status: "It is
evident, therefore, that DR 7-104(A)(1), both in origin and scope,
is primarily a rule of professional courtesy. If it were more than
that, DR 7-104(A)(1) also would have provided protection for
unrepresented parties ....",63 Further, in a sweeping statement at
the outset of the opinion, the Second Circuit adopted a significantly
narrower view of the supervisory power of federal courts than it
demonstrated in Hammad. Acknowledging that the interpretation of
DR 7-104(A)(1) would affect not only defense practices but could
also produce unwarranted changes in "traditional law enforcement"
practices, the court stated: "The conceded power of federal district
courts to supervise the conduct of attorneys should not be used as
a means to substantially alter federal criminal law practice.,
64
Although these subsequent cases have sought to isolate the
holding of Hammad, its continuing effects are substantial. First, it
has recently been cited by the Second Circuit to support the
proposition that the federal courts' general supervisory power over
attorneys allows them to promulgate rules of practice in criminal
investigations.65 Second, despite Simels, district courts within the
61 Id. at 650.
62 United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988).
63 Simels, 48 F.3d at 647.
6 Id. at 644 (footnote omitted).
65 United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 792 (2d Cir. 1996). See infra Part
II.A (discussing Ming He).
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circuit apparently continue to regard Hammad as authority for the
suppression of evidence pursuant to the supervisory power if an
otherwise lawful investigative tactic violates a disciplinary rule.66
Third, by allowing disciplinary rules to establish investigative
restrictions that the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States
do not impose, Hammad inspired other efforts by the organized bar
to make disciplinary rules the source of rights that the courts have
found do not otherwise exist. Some of these efforts have been
shamelessly self-serving. In 1989, the year after Hammad and
shortly after the Supreme Court rejected Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment challenges to the forfeiture of assets used to pay attorneys'
fees,67 a committee of the American Bar Association proposed an
ethical standard prohibiting prosecutors from seeking forfeiture of
assets that would be used to pay defense attorneys.68 Even stalwart
members of the defense bar harshly criticized this "audacious use
of power," which seemed to arise out of "a crass concern to protect
sources of income., 69 The measure was not included in the final
version adopted in 1992.70
After courts rejected Sixth Amendment challenges to subpoenas
to attorneys for fee information about clients, 71 amendments to
66 See United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(rejecting a motion to suppress statements made by a corrupt attorney on the
ground that the prosecutor failed promptly to report the defendant/attorney's
dishonesty to the grievance committee, in violation of DR 1-103(A)).
67 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
68 Robert G. Morvillo, Forfeiture of Legal Fees, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 2, 1991, at
3. Proposed Standard 3-3.12 of the Prosecution Function Standards of the
American Bar Association, adopted by the Criminal Justice Section in November
1989, states:
A prosecutor should not use statutory forfeiture provisions to prevent
a defendant from paying counsel of choice or paying other expenses
incident to presenting an effective defense, in the absence of reasonable
grounds to believe that these payments constitute a sham, fraud, or
criminal conduct.
Id.
69 id.
70 See Symposium, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul
Blows, " 53 U. PiTr. L. REv. 271, 277 n.25 (1992).
71 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1108 (1986); United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, 935 F.2d 501 (2d
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disciplinary rules were adopted restricting the use of such subpoe-
nas and requiring prior judicial approval before they are served.
The outcome of these efforts has been inconsistent and chaotic. For
example, an ethical rule requiring prior judicial approval of a grand
jury subpoena to a defense attorney constrains prosecutors in the
First Circuit;72 and a virtually identical rule was invalidated by the
Third Circuit.7 3 The challenge to a new Colorado rule regarding
attorney subpoenas is pending. One aspect of Colorado's rule,
which mirrors ABA Model Rule 3.8, is especially troubling. Like
other attorney-subpoena rules, it allows a prosecutor to subpoena
fee information only if it is "essential to the successful completion"
of the investigation.74 However, the Colorado Supreme Court has
eliminated the requirement of prior judicial approval.75 Thus, there
is no mechanism to obtain preclearance of such subpoenas. Any
prosecutor who serves one therefore runs the risk that a judge will
later deem the subpoena to have been "nonessential" and impose a
disciplinary sanction. It is hard to fathom a more powerful
disincentive to the taking of a concededly lawful investigative step.
The in terrorem effect of a state bar's rules of conduct are not
restricted to federal prosecutors in that state. A prosecutor whose
contacts with a represented target in the District of Columbia
survived a motion to suppress in a District of Columbia court was
nevertheless subjected to disciplinary action in New Mexico, where
Cir. 1991).
72 Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995).
The rule in Rhode Island was Rule 3.8(0 of the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id. at 1353. Added to the Model Rules in 1990, Rule
3.8(f) prohibited the subpoenaing of an attorney to give testimony about a client
without a showing of need, an adversary hearing and prior judicial approval. Id.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court had adopted the Model Rules, and the federal
district courts in Rhode Island had adopted Rhode Island's rules. Id.
73 Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992). The court held
that Rule 3. 10 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, which was
adopted by the federal district courts in Pennsylvania, could not be enforced
against federal prosecutors in those districts because: (1) its adoption exceeded
the rulemaking authority of the district courts; and (2) to do so would violate the
Supremacy Clause. Id. at 104.
74 COLO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f)(ii) (1997).
" Id. Rule 3.8 cmt. [3].
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he happened to be a member of the bar.76 The effort by the U.S.
Department of Justice to enjoin that disciplinary action on Suprem-
acy Clause grounds was rejected by the District of Columbia
Circuit on the ground that it had no personal jurisdiction over the
Chief Counsel of the New Mexico disciplinary committee.77
Moreover, despite its emphatic statement that federal courts
must determine the boundaries of ethical rules that affect federal
investigations, even Simels is vulnerable to "correction" by the state
bar. Simels did not overrule Hammad' application of the
no-contact rule to federal criminal investigations. Thus, Simels'
allocation of the power to interpret the rule to federal courts does
not alter the fact that the terms of the rule are the exclusive
prerogative of the state disciplinary apparatus. Put another way, for
all its discussion about avoiding the "balkanization"7 of the law
of federal investigations, Simels left intact the means by which the
state bar associations can balkanize it. The narrow interpretation of
DR 7-104(A)(1) was no doubt viewed by some as an invitation to
amend it.
The invitation has been accepted. The Second Circuit's narrow
interpretation of the term "party"--adopted for the explicit purpose
of keeping the disciplinary rules from becoming surrogate rules of
criminal practice-has caused the New York State Bar Association
to amend the rule to prohibit contacts with represented persons,
rather than parties. Explaining the change, which was adopted by
the House of Delegates on January 24, 1997, the association stated
that it was responding to "incorrect arguments" that the no-contact
rule applies only in matters that are "actively being litigated" and
"does not apply to non-party witnesses."7 9 These, however, are not
76 See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480-81 (D.N.M. 1992).
77 United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
78 Grievance Committee v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1995) (using
the word "balkanize" to describe the potential effects of requiring federal courts
to follow varied interpretations of disciplinary rules).
79 The quoted material appears in the "Explanation of Charge" accompanying
the Proposed Amendment to DR 7-104(A)(1) of the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility, adopted January 24, 1997. The amendment still
requires the approval of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York.
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just "arguments"-they can fairly be described as the holding of
Simels. The recent amendment, if accepted by the appellate
division, will no doubt be cited as a reason to once again apply the
no-contact rule to prosecutors in the preindictment investigative
setting.
Bar associations are not the only organizations seeking to
influence the impact of disciplinary rules on criminal investigations.
As a direct result of Hammad, the Department of Justice promul-
gated regulations permitting federal prosecutors to contact repre-
sented parties in certain circumstances.80 No-contact rules exempt
contacts "authorized by law," and the Department of Justice hopes
that its regulations will be recognized as the "law" by which its
prosecutors' contacts are "authorized."81 This effort has thus far
proven unsuccessful. No court has adopted the Department of
Justice's view that its own pronouncements suffice to exempt
contacts by federal prosecutors; some courts have rejected the
argument outright.82
Legislators have also gotten involved. A bill currently pending
in the United States House of Representatives would trump the
Department of Justice guidelines by subjecting federal prosecutors
to be subject to the state disciplinary rules despite the federal
regulations.83 In the last Congress, a Senate Bill would have
80 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994).
81 U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-13.240 (1994).
82 A district judge in Missouri flatly rejected the Department of Justice's
argument, finding it had no authority "to issue regulations which exempt its
attorneys from the requirements of state ethical rules." United States ex rel.
O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 4:93CV02188 (GFG), 1997 WL
106717, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 1997). A district court in California likewise
rejected as "preposterous" the attempt by the Department of Justice to rely on the
infamous "Thornburgh Memorandum," the predecessor of the new regulations.
United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated on
other grounds, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
A more recent decision of the Ninth Circuit states that "[r]ather than interpreting
the regulation as an exception to prevailing ethical norms [barring contact], we
believe that the regulation should be interpreted in accordancewith those norms."
Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996). See Schulman, supra
note 48, at 1119 (contending that the Department of Justice's regulations were
improperly promulgated and cannot preempt state ethical rules).
83 H.R. 232, 105th Cong. (introduced Jan. 7, 1997).
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produced the opposite result, i.e., it provided that the Attorney
General's rules of conduct applied to federal prosecutors notwith-
standing the ethical rules of the states.1
4
This fiasco, for which Hammad alone is responsible, raises
several important issues. Some are beyond the scope of this Article,
such as the obvious (and critical) question of who should decide the
substance of the rules governing the conduct of prosecutors and
defense attorneys in federal court proceedings. 85 For present
purposes, however, the pandemonium that is Hammad legacy is
the most dramatic example of the problems that can arise when a
court uses its supervisory power not to enforce existing rights, but
to create new ones that have been denied by other sources of
federal law.
II. UNITED STATES V. MING HE: REQUIRING COUNSEL To BE
PRESENT DURING DEBRIEFINGS OF COOPERATING WITNESSES
A. The Rule Established by Ming He
Ming He was a twenty-seven-year-old member of the Tung On,
a Chinatown gang. Ming He started out his relationship with the
government as a confidential informant, but his own involvement
in the gang's criminal activities resulted in a plea agreement that
provided for Ming He's cooperation as a witness. The agreement,
reached with the government after extensive negotiations with Ming
84 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995,
S. 75, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (introduced Jan. 4, 1995) ("Notwithstanding
the ethical rules or the rules of the court of any State, Federal rules of conduct
adopted by the Attorney General shall govern the conduct of prosecutions in the
courts of the United States.").
8 There is no shortage of views on this issue. See, e.g., Committee on
Criminal Law, supra note 29, at 21; Roger C. Crampton & Lisa K. Udell, State
Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact
and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 (1992); Green, supra note 48, at
460; F. Dennis Saylor & J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round
Hole; The Application of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L.
REV. 459 (1992).
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He and his attorney, called for Ming He to plead guilty to
racketeering.86
The cooperation agreement obligated Ming He to "cooperate
fully" with the prosecutor.87 Ming He agreed to be debriefed
about his criminal activities and to provide "truthful, complete and
accurate information" about them, as well as testimony at trials.88
In return, the government promised to file a motion pursuant to
United States Sentencing Guideline § 5Ki.1, which, as noted
above, would permit the district court to impose a sentence below
the prescribed range to reward Ming He for his "substantial
assistance" to the government.8 9 The agreement, however, specifi-
cally stated that the government's determination of whether Ming
He provided "substantial assistance" would be binding on him, as
would its determination of the "truthfulness, completeness and
accuracy" of the information he provided. 90
The prosecutor concluded that Ming He had not fully complied
with his obligations under the agreement. Specifically, during his
debriefings, Ming He was initially reluctant to acknowledge his role
in a murder conspiracy. However, rather than refusing to submit a
§ 5Kli.1 motion, which would have precluded any downward
departure at all, the prosecutor filed a motion but noted this
deficiency in Ming He's cooperation. As the Second Circuit put it,
the government "disparaged Ming He's assistance" in the motion,
informing the sentencing court that it did not call him as a witness
at the multi-defendant Tung On trial because of his initial untruth-
fulness during the debriefing sessions.9'
In a presentence submission, defense counsel objected to these
disparaging comments on the ground that they sought to penalize
Ming He for statements made in meetings outside her presence and
without her permission. Counsel claimed that had she been present
86 United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1996) (charging
Ming He with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962; the specified racketeering acts were
conspiracies to extort money from businesses and to commit arson).
87 Id. at 786.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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during the debriefing, she could have counselled Ming He to
answer the prosecutor's questions more truthfully.92
At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor stated that it was
the "standard practice" in the district to debrief cooperating
witnesses in the absence of counsel, a practice the district judge
found "unremarkable., 93 The court further found defense counsel's
stated practice of attending all such debriefings "unusual," noting
that most attorneys are "uninterested in attending their clients'
debriefing sessions."94 Explicitly relying on the prosecutor's
"disparaging" comments, the court granted only a minimal
downward departure-to sixty months from a sentencing range of
sixty-three to seventy-eight months.95
On appeal, the Second Circuit began with an analysis of "the
impact and utility of § 5K1.1 motions on sentencing. 96 The court
expressed harsh criticism of the new balance of power under the
guidelines. Before the guidelines, it observed that district judges
had the discretion to decide whether to reduce a sentence based on
substantial assistance. The court stated that because of their
experience, judges are "particularly well-positioned" (compared to
prosecutors) "to evaluate moral worthiness, contrition and rehabili-
tation," factors that are often critical in the sentencing of a
cooperating defendant.97 However, "[u]nder the Guidelines this
sentencing power-of such great moment to a cooperating
witness-was transferred from the sentencing court to the prosecu-
tor" by the requirement in § 5Kl.1 that a court may make a
downward departure for cooperation only when a prosecutor
authorizes it to do so by filing a motion.98
The court found this transfer of power from judges to prosecu-
tors "especially troubling" and subject to abuse.9 9 Quoting the
same passage of McNabb v United States that it relied on in
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
9' Id. at 787.
96 Id. at 788.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id
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Hammad, i.e., the "D]udicial supervision of the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts ... implies the duty of
establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence,"'0 0 the Second Circuit concluded that it had both the
authority and the obligation to prescribe rules to "balance this broad
executive discretion."'' 1
In exercising this power in the context of debriefing sessions,
the court evaluated the role of counsel at such meetings. In contrast
to the government's claim that counsel's role, if any, is limited to
telling her client to be truthful, the court listed various functions of
counsel: (1) explaining the government's questions; (2) keeping the
client calm, thus avoiding "unthinking answers" that are blurted
out; (3) keeping the client focused on the fact that the prosecutor
is his adversary; (4) resolving potential disagreements and assisting
the defendant in clarifying his answers to ensure they are complete
and accurate; and (5) serving as a potential witness to the complete-
ness of the client's cooperation. 1 2 Moreover, the court observed
that debriefing sessions have now become crucial events for
accomplice witnesses: the prosecutor has almost unreviewable
discretion to refuse to make a § 5KI.1 motion, 0 3 and such a
refusal could significantly increase the time the accomplice witness
will serve in prison. "To send a defendant into this perilous setting
without his attorney," the court concluded, is "inconsistent with the
fair administration of justice."'10 4 Thus, relying on its supervisory
power "to secure rights even though they may not be guaranteed by
the Constitution when we are persuaded [that] a procedure followed
in a trial court is wrong," the court held that "cooperating witnesses
are entitled to have counsel present at debriefings, unless they
explicitly waive such assistance."'105
"' Id at 789 (quoting Justice Frankfurter in McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 340 (1943)).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 789-90.
113 See United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 969 (1990).
104 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 790.
"o' Id. at 792-93.
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B. The Misunderstanding that Gave Rise to the Rule
The rule announced in Ming He is based on a misunderstanding
of how defense attorneys and prosecutors conduct themselves when
a defendant has chosen to cooperate. This misunderstanding is
responsible for the opinion's basic premise-that the prosecutors'
"standard practice" of debriefing a cooperating defendant in the
absence of counsel is somehow unfair or overreaching, or both.
In fact, "[t]he sentencing court found the challenged practice
'unremarkable"' because it is. 10 6 The overwhelming majority of
debriefing sessions with cooperating witnesses occur in the
prosecutors' offices without the presence of the witness's attorney.
Indeed, although the attorney knows that debriefings will occur
during the course of the cooperation, they almost always occur
without any notice to the attorney. This is not because prosecutors
are being sneaky, or because the attorneys for the witnesses are
being lazy or incompetent. Additionally, this does not happen
because attorneys fail to perform most of the functions identified
by the court in Ming He, including keeping the client calm and
focused, and explaining the procedure and the prosecutor's
questions. Rather, this happens because those functions are largely
performed at a prior and more critical stage of the investiga-
tion-the proffer sessions that precede a cooperation agreement.
1. The Proffer Session
The process of becoming a cooperating witness does not start
with debriefing sessions. Before the first such debriefing
occurs-before there is even a cooperation agreement-the
prosecutor will have at least one, and often several, substantive
meetings with the prospective cooperating witness. These meetings,
called "proffer sessions," always include counsel for the witness.
They occur pursuant to a separate, preliminary agreement called a
"proffer agreement. ' '
106 Id. at 786.
.07 See, e.g., United States v. Fagge, 101 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 1995)
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The purpose of the proffer session is to get all of the informa-
tion necessary to a plea offer (or to determine whether one will be
made) on the negotiating table. The prosecutor needs to know
several things before she can make an informed offer. Some relate
to the crime or crimes under investigation. Initially, the prosecutor
wants to know the defendant's version of his or her own role in the
crime. This will be measured against the information already
available to the investigators in an effort to determine whether the
prospective witness will tell the truth (or at least what the prosecu-
tor then believes to be the truth) about his or her own conduct.
Prospective cooperators rarely deny their criminality, but the
temptation to minimize it is strong, and for some it is insurmount-
able. Some proffer sessions end abruptly, without any plea offer,
because the defendant cannot pass even this first test.
Some also fail the next test as well, which is to talk about the
conduct of the others involved in the crime. Certain defendants who
genuinely want to be government witnesses are simply unable to
testify against other people, and do not get offered cooperation
agreements as a result.
The prosecutor also uses proffer sessions to determine what
"baggage" a witness will bring to the witness stand at trial. Because
future cross-examinations of the witness will not be limited to the
(noting that prior to two proffer sessions, appellant signed a proffer agreement
that provided: "Should any prosecutions be brought against Client by this Office,
the government will not offer in evidence on its case-in-chief, or in connection
with any sentencing proceeding for the purpose of determining an appropriate
sentence, any statements made by Client at the meeting . . . ."). A proffer
agreement is a contract setting forth the terms defining how a particular
"defendant is debriefed by the government in exchange for limited use
immunity." Lawrence D. Finder, Supreme Court Examines Waiver of Defendant's
Procedural Rights, 32 Hous. LAW. 10, 10 (1994). The agreement ensures both
that the government will have the opportunity to examine information provided
by the defendant, and that such information will not be used against the
defendant at trial, should negotiations fail. Id. Additionally, "most proffer
agreements also contain a waiver clause that allows the government to impeach
the defendant at trial with his proffered statements should the defendant's
testimony vary from the information he provided during the proffer." id. Finally,
proffer agreements generally do not protect against the derivative use of the
defendant's statements.
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crimes under investigation, the prosecutor needs to know about all
of the criminal activity in the witness's past, whether or not the
government is aware of it.' Prior crimes that are disclosed
during the proffer session will be covered by any resulting plea
agreement, so the terms of the government's offer (and, indeed,
whether there will be an offer at all) depend in part on the other
criminal activity disclosed during the proffer session.'0 9 Thus, at
bottom, the prospective cooperating witness is asked in a proffer
session to tell a prosecutor about crimes the prosecutor has no
knowledge of, which may result in a worse deal (or no deal at all)
for the witness." 0 Needless to say, this sort of disclosure does not
come naturally to experienced criminals.
The attorney for the prospective witness plays a crucial role
during the proffer sessions. These are the client's first face-to-face
contacts with the prosecutor and case agent. There is every reason
to be nervous "because the interview process intimidates" and
because the client is expected to incriminate "people who may be
predisposed to commit violence against him or his family.'.
The lawyer often helps the client resist the natural temptation to
"' See United States v. Resto, 74 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1996) (setting forth
that a cooperating defendant's truthfulness about his own past crimes is "highly
relevant to the quality of his cooperation").
.09 For example, prospective witnesses who are arrested on mail fraud
charges may enter a proffer session with the reasonable expectation that
prosecutors will "allow" them to pleadguilty to a single five-year maximum mail
fraud count in exchange for cooperation. If the proffer session, however, reveals
that the witness killed Jimmy Hoffa, the prosecutor may require a guilty plea that
carries the potential for longer imprisonment as a condition of cooperation. This
is only natural; simply as a matter of right and wrong, the prosecutor may feel
uncomfortable with allowing a plea of guilty to a five-year count to satisfy the
defendant's criminal exposure for a murder. More selfishly, the prosecutor will
worry that some future jury will conclude that the government paid too high a
price for the testimony, and thus reject the testimony and perhaps the entire case.
"o This practice of obtaining a full proffer of all prior crimes prevails in
many districts, including the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, but is
not universal. For example, some United States Attorney's offices will enter into
cooperation agreements that do not cover prior crimes of violence. A proffer
session leading up to such an agreement will therefore be limited-employing a
"don't ask, don't tell" approach to violent crimes.
... Ming He, 94 F.3d at 789-90.
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minimize the client's involvement in the crimes under investigation
and plays the central role in persuading the client to reveal prior
crimes, as criminals simply do not trust a prosecutor who says that
it is in the client's interest to do so.' The lawyer must "keep her
client focused on the fact that while he is seeking the assistance and
protection of the government, that entity does not share the
defendant's interests." ' 1 3 Indeed, the adversarial posture of the
prosecutor is at its most acute during proffer sessions. The typical
proffer agreement provides only limited protection to the prospec-
tive witness if no plea agreement results from the sessions, and
does not prohibit the derivative use of the defendant's statements
to pursue further investigation. Thus, a prospective witness who
fails this audition and gets no agreement may well be helping the
government strengthen its existing case and, perhaps, to add new
charges as well.
To borrow a phrase from Ming He, "to send a defendant into
this perilous setting without his attorney is ... inconsistent with the
fair administration of justice.""' 4 That is why it does not happen;
defense attorneys invariably attend proffer sessions, where they
perform most of the functions that the Ming He court assumed
counsel performed during the debriefing sessions. Indeed, this
occurred during the three debriefing sessions that constituted the
"extensive negotiations" leading to the plea agreement in Ming
He.
115
12 As counterintuitive as it seems to these clients to tell the government
about crimes no one knows about, defense counsel will frequently advise them
that it is in their best interests to do so. Because the prosecutor's principal goal
is to enlist testimony against someone else, it is often a good time to clean all
the past skeletons out of the closet and wrap them up in one favorable plea
agreement. Also, few defendants are worse off than one who has pleaded guilty
under a cooperation agreement, claiming to have disclosed all prior crimes to the
government, only to have an undisclosed crime come to light after the agreement
is reached. That defendant can both lose the § 5K1.1 motion with regard to the
sentence on a guilty plea and, because the undisclosed crime is not covered by
the plea agreement, be prosecuted separately for that crime.
" Ming He, 94 F.3d at 790.
114 Id.
1.5 Id. at 786. Ming He's brief reveals that during the first two proffer
sessions, the prosecutors maintained that Ming He was falsely minimizing his
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2. The Debriefing Sessions
The culmination of a successful proffer is a cooperation
agreement, which is signed by both the defendant and his or her
attorney. These agreements require the defendant to "cooperate
fully" with the prosecutor, which explicitly includes the obligation
to attend debriefing sessions." 6 The purpose of the debriefing
sessions is to elicit further details of the crimes discussed during
the proffer sessions and to prepare the witness for testifying. The
number of debriefing sessions varies widely. If the other targets of
the investigation all plead guilty, for-example, there may never be
any debriefing sessions at all. On the other end of the spectrum,
some witnesses testify in as many as a dozen proceedings, and
attend hundreds of debriefings spanning years.
Some defense attorneys attend at least part of the initial
debriefing session simply because it often occurs immediately after
the execution of the cooperation agreement. Others attend the initial
session, or part of it, to make sure that there is a smooth transition
from the high-pressure proffer sessions into the laborious (and
sometimes excruciatingly boring) process of eliciting details and
preparing testimony. But, as noted above, the overwhelming
majority of debriefing sessions are conducted in the absence of
counsel for the accomplice witness simply because defense
attorneys choose not to attend them.
There are various reasons for the defense attorney's absence.
First, these meetings are often measured in days, not hours, and
frequently occur after normal business hours and on weekends,
especially when they are held during trial. A commitment to attend
them all could seriously intrude upon, and in a few instances
effectively displace, the rest of a criminal practice. Expense to the
client might thus be one reason for the general practice of attorneys
to stay away from debriefing sessions. However, there are certainly
role in the conspiracy. See Brief for Appellant at 3-4, United States v. Ming He,
94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-133 1). In the third session, it agreed that
Ming He was finally being truthful, and the attorneys agreed to enter into a
cooperation agreement. Id.
116 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 786.
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others, as evidenced by the fact that attorneys representing non-
paying clients, such as Federal Defenders and court-appointed
attorneys, generally stay away as well.
A second reason why counsel for the witness do not attend
debriefing sessions is that some lawyers are concerned that their
attendance creates the risk that they will become witnesses
themselves. There are at least two ways that can occur. The first
places the lawyer in the awkward position of providing testimony
that undermines the client's cooperation. This may occur when: (1)
the lawyer attends the debriefing sessions and takes notes, as
lawyers invariably do; (2) the cooperating witness later testifies
against a co-conspirator; and (3) the co-conspirator's attorney
subpoenas the cooperator's attorney's notes. At least one district
court has required the disclosure of such notes for use in impeach-
ing the cooperator's testimony,"7 a decision that continues to
rankle the white collar defense bar and provides a deterrent to
attending debriefing sessions."' The second way to become a
witness is in the unusual event of a dispute over what the witness
actually said (or did not say) during the debriefings. Neither of
these situations is palatable to the defense attorney. In the first
situation, the attorney's work product is used to undermine his
client's testimony. Because the prosecutive value of the testimony
may have a bearing on the ultimate sentence of the witness, the
attorney's work product could conceivably produce a longer
sentence for the client. In the second situation, the attorney may
actually help the client, but can no longer represent him because
the need for the attorney as a witness may result in disqualifi-
cation." 9
" See United States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., No. 88-CR-796 (CSH), 1989
WL 153353 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1989).
..8 See Elkan Abramowitz, The Dilemma of Defense Counsel's Notes, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 2, 1993, at 3; John S. Siffert & R. Erik Lillquist, Changing Role of
Defense Counsel, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13, 1997, at 2.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Kwang Fu Peng, 766 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir.
1985) (holding that where a defense attorney attended a post-arrest meeting
between his client and the victim, which put the attorney in the position of being
a potential witness, disqualification of the attorney at trial was proper).
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Although expense, boredom and the fear of becoming a witness
all provide disincentives to attending debriefing sessions, defense
attorneys are too conscientious to stay away for those reasons
alone, and they are not so timid that they fail to attend simply
because of the standard practice not to invite them. Rather, they do
not attend because their presence is not necessary. The reality is
that the defense attorney regards the prosecutor as the cooperating
defendant's ally.
Indeed, Ming He is founded in large measure on a misappre-
hension of the relationship between cooperating defendants and
prosecutors. The court suggested a dim view of cooperators: "Many
view a cooperating witness as a betrayer or informer; unquestion-
ably, such a person is not generally held in high regard. But the
fairness of our system of criminal justice may best be seen in its
treatment of those individuals held in low esteem. 1 20 The court
exercised its supervisory power to create "a more level playing
field" for this lowly breed of defendant--"to protect the cooper-
ating witness" from the prosecutor. 12 ' They need this protection,
the court found, regardless of how "one may appraise a cooperating
witness's moral worth."1
22
In fact, most prosecutors have a far more favorable opinion of
accomplice witnesses. Many believe, for example, that if two
people plan and carry out a murder, the one who pleads guilty and
testifies truthfully should be held in much higher regard than the
one who remains silent and puts the government to its proof.
Although prosecutors' more favorable opinion of cooperating
defendants may well be skewed by their selfish desire to bring
more cases, it is also based on the notion, accepted even by the
court in Ming He, that cooperation with the government reveals
something positive about a defendant's moral worthiness, contrition
and prospects for rehabilitation.1 23 In addition, the interactions
between the accomplice witness and the prosecutor tend to
"humanize" the witness and instill more compassion in the
prosecutor's decisions.
20 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 785.
121 Id. at 785, 789.
212 Id. at 794.
123 Id. at 788.
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Indeed, a poll of the criminal defense bar would reveal a
widely-held view that prosecutors are altogether too cozy with
accomplice witnesses. Defense attorneys commonly argue that as
long as the witness testifies in a way that helps the government,
prosecutors either overlook or are willing to forgive the witness
who has been caught in a lie. This skepticism is not limited to
defense attorneys. Some judges do not permit, or at least restrict,
prosecutors' stock jury argument that cooperating witnesses should
be believed because of their enforceable written promise to tell the
truth. 24
Thus, once a cooperation agreement has been negotiated for the
client, the attorney who turns the client over to the prosecutor for
debriefings has every reason to believe that the client could not be
in safer hands. There is a very powerful institutional incentive for
prosecutors to foster cooperation--"if [the government] fails to
exercise its discretion fairly and even-handedly, valuable informa-
tion and assistance will be lost, because defendants may come to
regard ... prosecutors as untrustworthy and simply refuse to
cooperate with them. 12 1 Moreover, the government is not the
only repeat player in the market for cooperation; the defense
attorney's presence in the case (even if not at the debriefing
24 See, e.g., United States v. Lyken, No. 96-CR-612 (ERK) (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
27, 1996). In Lyken, the court instructed the jury as follows:
[The cooperating witness'] motive to testify falsely is not eliminated
by the fact that the agreement this witness may have entered into with
the U.S. Attorney requires her to testify truthfully. You should consider
whether the witness may nevertheless believe that, if she says what she
thinks is helpful to the prosecution, it is unlikely that the U.S. Attorney
will claim she lied and withdraw benefits conferred by the plea
agreement.
Id.
'25 United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 969 (1990). See United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that the strong interest of law enforcement in cultivating cooperating
defendants eliminates the danger that prosecutors will misuse the power vested
in them by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5KI.1), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046
(1990).
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sessions) provides a further incentive for the prosecutor to treat the
defendant fairly.
12 6
Ironically, Ming He demonstrates the propensity of prosecutors
to act in favor of cooperating witnesses even if they may not
deserve it under their agreement. The prosecutor concluded that
Ming He initial false statement about the degree of his own
criminal activity rendered him unusable as a witness. The prosecu-
tor would have been well within her rights under the cooperation
agreement to withhold the § 5KI.1 motion; she could even have
prosecuted Ming He for making the false statements. The prosecu-
tor did neither. Rather, she made the § 5KI.1 motion anyway, thus
allowing the district court to confer whatever benefit for substantial
assistance it deemed appropriate. In focusing on the "disparaging"
nature of the government's motion, 127 the Ming He decision
failed to take sufficient notice of the fact that the existence of the
motion itself undermined the court's belief that a potential
"prosecutorial overreaching" inheres in this relationship.'28
3. The Futility of the Rule and Its Unintended Adverse
Consequences
The exercise of the supervisory power in Ming He resulted in
a rule that is of virtually no utility to its intended beneficiaries.
126 William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L.
REV. 761, 832-33 (1989) ("Many defense lawyers are repeat players with whom
the government must deal often. If prosecutors renege on their bargains, counsel
will learn not to trust them, and future bargains simply will not be made.").
127 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 795.
128 Id. at 789. The court's misunderstanding of the relationship between
prosecutors and cooperating witnesses is further evidenced by its reliance on
UnitedStates v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932 (1988).
The court incorrectly found the facts in Ming He and Pinto to be "quite similar."
Ming He, 94 F.3d at 791. Pinto chastised a prosecutor for questioning a potential
defense witness in the absence of his court-appointed attorney. Pinto, 850 F.2d
at 93 1. By contrast, the witness in Ming He, in an agreement negotiated and
executed by his attorney, promised to meet with and testify for the government
in exchange for an important benefit. There are no practitioners of federal
criminal law who would regard the witnesses in these two cases as similarly
situated.
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This became clear less than two months after Ming He was
decided, when the court decided United States v Brechner.
129
Milton Brechner, who was awaiting sentence on tax evasion
charges, contacted the government to offer his assistance (in
exchange for a "5K1.1 motion") against a corrupt bank officer he
had been bribing. Following a proffer session, Brechner entered
into a cooperation agreement, pursuant to which he recorded
conversations with the bank officer for approximately a year. After
the prosecutor announced his intention to indict the banker, he
scheduled a debriefing session with Brechner. 3
Perhaps because eighteen months had passed since the proffer
session, Brechner's attorney attended the debriefing session.
Brechner was asked about the source of the kickbacks he had
received as part of his tax evasion scheme. He initially denied
receiving such payments from two named sources, but his attorney
took him aside for a moment, and then Brechner promptly
acknowledged his receipt of those payments.' Thus, Brechner's
attorney performed precisely the role that Ming He envisioned for
attorneys in proffer sessions-he "resolve[d] potential disagree-
ments between the government and the defendant and assist[ed] the
defendant in clarifying his answers to ensure they [were] complete
and accurate."'3
2
The Assistant United States Attorney refused to make the
"5K1.1 motion" anyway, and the court of appeals upheld that
decision. It explicitly rejected the argument that Brechner's
immediate correction of his misstatement rendered the breach
immaterial, and credited the prosecutor's judgment that the lapse of
credibility seriously undermined Brechner's potential as a wit-
ness. 1
33
Ming He thus requires the presence of counsel at debriefing
sessions (absent an explicit waiver) to protect against disparaging
comments by prosecutors in "5K1 .1 motions." Brechner, however,
makes clear that even if the lawyer attends the sessions and helps
29 99 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996).
130 Id. at 97-98.
131 Id.
132 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 790.
3 Brechner, 99 F.3d at 99.
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"fix" the false statements, the prosecutor is not only free to
disparage the cooperation, but may properly refuse to make any
motion at all.
The right created by Ming He has also been rendered useless by
a new practice in the New York City United States Attorneys'
Offices: standard cooperation agreements now include a waiver of
the Ming He "right." The waivers have not been difficult to
procure, since most defense attorneys had no interest in attending
debriefing sessions. However, this issue has given rise to an
unintended consequence that adversely impacts the defendants who
are supposedly protected by the rule. As two New York defense
attorneys have stated:
[T]he holding in Ming He actually creates a new risk by
allowing prosecutors to require that defendants sign
cooperation agreements containing a blanket waiver of
their right to representation at debriefing sessions. Prior to
Ming He most prosecutors did not refuse to allow attorneys
to be present. Now, however, any U.S. Attorney's office in
the Second Circuit can bar counsel from sessions merely
by incorporating a blanket waiver provision into the
cooperation agreement. 134
Thus, the ironic result of Ming He may well be to reduce the small
percentage of debriefing sessions that are attended by counsel for
the witness.
There is another potential adverse consequence of the rule in
Ming He that is less susceptible of verification, but no less real.
Ming He's exclusive focus on the cooperating witness ignored the
other category of defendants whose interests are at stake in a
debriefing session-the ultimate targets of the investigation. They
are not present, of course, but they feel the brunt of the cooper-
ator's testimony. To the extent that Ming He suggests that attorneys
for the witness should take an active role in "clarifying" answers
and discrepancies between the witness's and the prosecutor's
version of events, it inadvertently creates the danger of real
prejudice to the targets-the danger that the details provided by the
witness will be tailored to conform to the prosecutor's expectations.
114 Siffert & Liliquist, supra note 118, at 2 (footnote omitted).
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It is true that this danger is always present, even in the absence of
the attorney for the witness. However, Ming He promotes the
notion that the nitty gritty of a witness's testimony can be the
subject of an ongoing negotiation with the government. Since
everyone in the room has the same goal-producing valuable
testimony-the real losers could well be the people who are
indicted based on the testimony. Especially since it is not uncom-
mon for prosecutors in the midst of investigations to have incorrect
theories of what happened, Ming He ' contribution to the already
existing pressure to conform testimony in debriefing sessions may
cause serious prejudice to the defendants against whom cooperating
witnesses eventually testify.
Thus, at best, the exercise of the supervisory power in Ming He
was futile; at worst, it backfired. The court's objective-to help a
particular category of defendants in their dealings with increasingly
powerful prosecutors-can scarcely be criticized. However, its
attempt to tinker with the balance of power in the investigative
setting not only intruded on presumably lawful conduct of the
executive branch, but ran the risk of misgauging the dynamics of
the relationships in that setting between the attorneys and between
cooperating witnesses and prosecutors. That risk has materialized.
The court perceived an objectionable prosecutorial prac-
tice-conducting debriefings without the witness's counsel-and
exercised its "supervisory authority to bring it to an end."'' 35
However, the rule it announced has likely, and inadvertently,
produced the opposite result of making the practice more prevalent.
Further, taken together with Brechner, these defendants may now
be worse off: rather than receive the benefit of a § 5KI.1 motion
in which the prosecutor engages in full disclosure to the sentencing
court (i.e., makes "disparaging" remarks about the deficiencies in
the cooperation), the witness may get no motion, and no departure
at all.
' Ming He, 94 F.3d at 785.
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C. The Proper Scope of the Supervisory Power
In both Hammad and Ming He, the Second Circuit's exercise
of its supervisory power proceeds from the same premise. Both
cases rely heavily on United States v McNabb,'36 and indeed
quote the same passage of Justice Frankfurter's description of the
federal courts' duty of "establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence." '137 Hammad goes on to rely
on McNabb ' authorization of the exclusion of evidence obtained
by "willful disobedience of law."' 13 8 Ming He relies on a slightly
different form of this supervisory power: the federal courts'
inherent authority to fashion procedural rules to ensure that their
proceedings are fair. Because the prosecutor's practice at issue in
Ming He influenced sentencing proceedings for cooperating
witnesses, the court was persuaded that "a procedure followed in
[the] trial court is wrong," and fashioned a rule to correct it.139
When viewed as the authority to establish and maintain
civilized standards of procedure and evidence, the supervisory
power seems broad indeed. However, the decisions of the Supreme
Court give the scope of this authority far more definition than the
foregoing quotation from McNabb suggests.
The supervisory power was first announced in McNabb, a
murder case in which agents interrogated several young, uneducated
members of a Tennessee clan of mountaineers. The interrogations
were plainly overbearing, not only because they spanned more than
two days, but because the defendants were held incommunicado
and questioned intermittently during the day and night by up to six
officers. Eventually, each of the defendants made incriminating
statements. 140
136 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
131 Id. at 340 (quoted in United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 789 (2d Cir.
1996; and United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 841 (2d Cir. 1988)).
118 United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 841 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
139 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792.
140 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 335-36.
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The two-day interrogations violated a statutory requirement that
the arresting officer promptly take the defendant to the nearest
available judicial officer.14' Although Congress had not explicitly
forbidden the use of confessions obtained in violation of these
statutes, the Supreme Court found that the admission of such
evidence "would stultify the policy which Congress ha[d] enacted
into law."' 42 Declining to reach the constitutional issue raised by
the defendants, the Court stated its power to supervise the adminis-
tration of justice in federal courts: "Judicial supervision of the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the
duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence.' ' 143 That statement cannot properly be
read to support a broad-ranging power in federal judges to
announce standards of conduct for law enforcement. Rather,
McNabb linked the supervisory power directly to the integrity of
judicial proceedings. Observing that the failure to suppress the
confessions obtained in flagrant violation of federal law would
make the courts "accomplices in wilful disobedience of law," the
Court held that the remedy of suppression was available to the
defendants. 144
McNabb was the first of a series of Supreme Court cases in
which the supervisory power was used substantively, that is, to
provide a remedy for the violation of a recognized right of a
criminal defendant. The Supreme Court has since made clear that
this is one of the proper uses of its inherent authority. 14 The
Court has exercised this power to exclude confessions obtained in
violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)'s requirement
that an arrestee be taken before the nearest available magistrate
14 The requirement was set forth in part in 18 U.S.C. § 595, the predecessor
to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 595 required the
arresting officer to take the defendant to the nearest available United States
Commissioner or judicial officer. The statute authorizing arrests by the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, 5 U.S.C. § 300a, required that the defendant be taken
before a committing officer "immediately." Id. at 342.
142 Id. at 345.
141 Id. at 340.
144 Id. at 345-46.
141 See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
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judge without "unnecessary delay."' 46 Similarly, it has excluded
evidence that had been seized by state officials in violation of the
U.S. Constitution and then turned over to the federal authori-
ties. "'47 The legitimacy of this type of supervisory power is not
beyond debate, especially when it is used to remedy nonconstitu-
tional violations. 4 8 However, the boundaries of this form of
supervisory power are relatively easy to discern; it may only be
invoked when the law enforcement conduct has violated the U.S.
Constitution, a federal statute or a federal rule. As the Court stated
in McNabb, this type of supervising does not purport to be
"concerned with law enforcement practices" per se. 4 9 Rather, it
is concerned with those practices only to the extent they taint the
judicial process: by receiving evidence obtained in violation of law,
the "courts themselves become instruments of law enforce-
ment." 150
The Supreme Court's decisions establish another category of
supervisory power cases in which the Court states general rules of
procedure applicable to federal criminal proceedings. These
decisions all involve, as Professor Beale has phrased it, "concerns
intrinsic to the judicial process," arising out of a desire "to enhance
the accuracy and fairness of federal criminal proceedings."' 5 1
There are many such decisions, and all involve the supervision of
events that occur in federal courtrooms. 52
146 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 452-53 (1957) (following the
reasoning of McNabb).
147 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (overruling the "silver
platter" doctrine originating in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949)).
141 See Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases;
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1494-06 (1984) (suggesting that the U.S. Constitution
authorizes federal courts to fashion remedies of constitutional violations, and
perhaps of violations of federal rules, but not of violations of acts of Congress).
Beale's article sets forth a comprehensive and excellent discussion of the origins,
legitimacy and sources of the supervisory power, a subject that is beyond the
scope of this Article.
149 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 347.
150 Id.
's' Beale, supra note 148, at 1490, 1449-50.
152 See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1975) (requiring
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Most of the Supreme Court's supervisory power decisions fall
in these two categories, and the large majority fall in the latter
category-they establish rules for judicial proceedings. 153
Although there have been exceptions, 5 4 the Court has never
exercised the supervisory power to fashion a new standard of
conduct for law enforcement officers engaged in criminal investiga-
tions. Moreover, its most recent treatment of the issue of super-
visory power casts grave doubt on the authority of courts to
prescribe rules of conduct in criminal investigations.
United States v Williams1" addressed the role of the super-
visory power in the "no-man's land" between the courts' own
processes and the operations of law enforcement: the federal grand
jury. The lower federal courts, including the Second Circuit, had
frequently resorted to the supervisory power to prescribe rules of
conduct for prosecutors in the grand jury.5 6 In some of these
cases, the supervisory power was used not to enforce a violation of
the U.S. Constitution, statute or rule, but to impose a procedural
requirement that the Supreme Court had already concluded was not
required by existing law.'57
disclosures at trial to permit effective cross-examination); McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 1171 (1969) (establishing procedure for accepting guilty
plea); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959) (per curiam) (ordering
a new trial when jurors were exposed to prejudicial publicity); Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, 55 (1957) (qualifying the "informer's privilege" to require
disclosure of identity of informant when that is essential to a fair trial); Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 15 (1954) (holding that summary contempt
proceeding may not be tried by a district judge who is embroiled in controversy
with alleged contemnor); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)
(holding that jurors must be selected from fair cross-section of community).
' See Beale, supra note 148, at 1448-56.
154 See Beale, supra note 148, at 1448 n.101.
... 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
'56 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 778 (2d Cir. 1976)
(dismissing perjury indictment where the prosecutor failed to follow the office's
practice of administering certain warnings before allegedly perjurious testimony),
cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132,
1133 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissing indictment where grand jury was misled into
thinking that it was receiving eyewitness, rather than hearsay, testimony).
' The limitations placed on the use of hearsay evidence by the court in
United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972), for example, were
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Williams involved a Tenth Circuit rule that required prosecutors
to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. The
Supreme Court held that the supervisory judicial authority on which
the rule was based did not exist. In doing so, it reaffirmed the
limitations of both strands of the supervisory authority supported
by its previous decisions. It held that the substantive strand may
properly be invoked only "to prevent parties from reaping benefit
or incurring harm from violations of substantive or procedural rules
(imposed by the U.S. Constitution or laws)."' 58 Thus, where
prosecutorial misconduct violates one of the federal rules governing
grand jury practice, the supervisory power is available to enforce
those rules. Since there was no rule regarding the presentation of
exculpatory evidence, the Tenth Circuit's imposition of that
requirement was improper. As for the procedural component of the
supervisory power, Williams stressed that it "deal[s] strictly with
the courts' power to control their own procedures."' 59 In light of
the grand jury's "operational separateness from its constituting
court," its processes are simply not those of the court, and the
supervisory power may thus not be used to prescribe modes of
grand jury procedure. 6 0
Williams is especially instructive because of the unique position
of the grand jury between the judicial and executive branches. It
has an institutional relationship with the court, which both
empanels it and presides over disputes occurring within it, and it
thus has been characterized as an arm of the court.'6 ' It has also
been described, accurately, as an investigative agency of the
executive branch. 162 However the grand jury is characterized,
there is no aspect of federal criminal investigations that is more
closely related to the judicial branch. The supervisory authority of
rejectedby the Supreme Court in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
58 Williams, 504 U.S. at 46 (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,
487 U.S. 250 (1988)).
9 Id. at 45.
160 Id. at 49-50. See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of
Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 355, 408-09 (1996) (noting that the
"inherent authority" over prosecutors is normally limited to in-court behavior).
161 See Beale, supra note 148, at 1459 n.183 (collecting cases).
162 Beale, supra note 148, at 1459 n.183 (collecting cases).
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federal courts therefore ought to be most expansive in that
context. 63 That the supervisory power is narrowly circumscribed
in the grand jury context places in clear relief the limited authority
to supervise other aspects of criminal investigations.
Thus, with the narrow exception of matters occurring in the
federal grand jury, the supervisory power of federal district courts
should be limited to fashioning remedies for violations of existing
federal law and prescribing rules of procedure for their own,
in-house proceedings. Once the supervisory power exceeds these
boundaries, it intrudes on the functions and prerogatives of the
other branches of government. The use of the power to implement
remedies for violations of the U.S. Constitution or existing federal
law implicates the integrity of the judicial branch. Judges have a
legitimate interest in fashioning remedies that keep the proceedings
before them free from the taint of illegally obtained evidence.
However, "rarely, if ever, will judicial integrity be threatened by
conduct outside the courtroom that does not violate a federal
statute, the Constitution or a procedural rule."'164 Indeed, there is
163 For that reason, although courts are divided on the question, there may
well remain the authority to dismiss indictments based on grand jury misconduct
even in the absence of a violation of a rule or a statute or the U.S. Constitution.
See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, No. 95-CR-0754 (HB), 1996 WL 479441,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1996) ("[C]ourts may only dismiss an indictment for
prosecutorial misconduct where such misconduct violates a clearly established
Rule of Criminal Procedure, statute or constitutional guarantee."); United States
v. Orjuela, 809 F. Supp. 193, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (interpreting Williams as
leaving open the possibility that certain kinds of prosecutorial misconduct could
warrant the dismissal of an indictment). In Williams, the Court provided that
"any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of
grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the power
they maintain over their own proceedings." Williams, 504 U.S. at 50 (emphasis
added). Thus, although some limited authority may remain, it is unclear(1) what
sorts of prosecutorial conduct could trigger a court's use of its supervisory
powers; and (2) how close that conduct would come to a due process violation.
See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 259-61 (1988)
(suggesting that dismissal of an indictment might be appropriate if prosecutor
suborns perjury, or if there is "a history of prosecutorial misconduct, spanning
several cases, that is so systematic and pervasive as to raise a substantial and
serious question about the fundamental fairness of the process").
164 United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991).
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no judicial integrity interest at stake in such circumstances. The
refusal to provide a federal forum for the trial of criminal charges
because of judicial disapproval of a practice permitted by the U.S.
Constitution and Congress intrudes on the functions of the
legislative and executive branches.' 65
In addition, the deployment of the supervisory power outside of
its proper boundaries puts judges in uncharted territory. Courts are
not well-equipped to evaluate the merits of particular investigative
practices. The adjudicative process is not designed to gather the
type of information available to policymakers, and the required
focus on only the issue in dispute precludes the broader perspective
that policymakers should bring to the task. The expansion of
judicial supervisory power in this area creates rules based on
misunderstandings of investigations or other extrinsic, nonjudicial
processes. Judicial supervision of this sort also produces the
uncertainty that undefined, unbounded power engenders.'66
Hammad and Ming He plainly exceed the boundaries of the
supervisory power. The law enforcement conduct at issue in
Hammad complied with the U.S. Constitution and the laws and
rules governing federal criminal investigations. There can be no
argument that the integrity of the judicial process is tainted by the
receipt into evidence of statements obtained from represented
targets, especially when those statements would be received without
question in the fortuitous event that the prosecutor was isolated
from this aspect of the investigation. By substituting a rule of
professional conduct for a positive statement of federal law
protecting all defendants from the government, Hammad exercised
substantive supervisory power in the absence of a violation of an
established standard. 167
165 See Beale, supra note 148, at 1508-10.
166 See, e.g., United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996). Now
that the rule requiring the presence of counsel at debriefing sessions absent a
waiver has been nullified by standard-form waivers, there have already been calls
for the exercise of the supervisory power to prohibit the waivers. Edward M.
Shaw, Sentencing Departure for Cooperation and Contract Law, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
26, 1977, at 1.
167 United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Ming He based its exercise of authority in part on purely
procedural grounds. It stated correctly that its supervisory authority
extends to sentencing, and reasoned that the effect of the practice
at issue on the sentencing of cooperating witnesses rendered the
exercise of supervisory authority appropriate.'68
This approach misconstrues the breadth of the authority to
fashion procedural rules for the court's own proceedings. Every
form of evidence-gathering by law enforcement officials can affect
sentencing, but that does not give judges the power to prescribe the
rules of investigation. The right to supervise the judicial process is
much narrower. It is limited to the proceedings that occur in the
courthouse. The case relied on by Ming He, United States v
Herrera-Figueroa,'69 demonstrated the limitation. In that case, the
Ninth Circuit exercised its supervisory power to direct that
probation officers in the circuit must permit attorneys to attend
presentence interviews.17 The Probation Department is indisput-
ably an arm of the judicial branch. As the Ninth Circuit stated: "In
prescribing a rule applicable only to the conduct of personnel
within the judicial branch, we act in a sphere where the scope of
our supervisory power is at its apex."'' Indeed, it explicitly
cautioned against the use of this authority to set rules of conduct
for members of the executive branch. 7 That is precisely what
Ming He accomplishes.
CONCLUSION
Although the temptation to supervise prosecutors is very strong,
the power of federal courts to prescribe standards of conduct for
them is limited. The power to fashion rules of procedure does not
reach beyond the judicial process itself. The power to remedy
improper conduct is limited to violations of federal law in the
evidence-gathering process that actually prejudice defendants.
168 Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792.
169 918 F.2d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1990).
,70 Id. at 1433.
'7' Id. at 1434.
172 Id. at 1434 n.7 (citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977)).
466
SUPER VISING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
That judges may lack the power to create and enforce new rules
for criminal investigations does not render them powerless in
dealing with prosecutorial misconduct. Extensive self-regulation by
the Department of Justice exists, governing not only contacts with
represented persons, but also the issuance of subpoenas to defense
attorneys, 73 communications with the media, 174 warnings to
grand jury witnesses, 175 subpoenas to the media 76 and a host
of other activities. One method of deterring objectionable conduct
is requesting that the Department of Justice initiate its own
disciplinary proceeding. 177 Although there is natural cynicism
about the efficacy of self-policing, particularly in the defense bar,
this is real discipline. The Department of Justice receives many
complaints of prosecutorial misconduct, investigates these com-
plaints and publicly discloses its findings and its disposition of the
allegations. 78
In any event, if there is in fact a delegation of excessive power
to prosecutors, the appropriate and principled way to remedy it is
through remedial legislation or the promulgation of federal rules
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. 179 Although the supervisory
power of federal courts may seem the easier way to, judges have
learned the hard way-through Hammad and Ming He-that their
temptation must be resisted.
171 See U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 81, § 9-2.16(a).
174 U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 81, §§ 1-7.400, 9-2.211.
'71 U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 81, § 9-11.150.
176 U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 81, § 9-2.161.
177 See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983); 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.39 et seq.
178 See, e.g., OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FISCAL YEAR 1995
ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
179 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077.
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